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Financial Regulation 
in a Global Marketplace
C H A R L E S  W.  C A L O M I R I S  
a n d  R O B E R T  E .  L I TA N
RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, conglomeration, mergers, and
globalization are rocking the financial industry here and abroad. In this
paper we primarily address the implications of globalization for prudential
regulation of firms in the financial industry. However, given the importance
of the other three forces—and the extent to which they reinforce or 
are by-products of the trend toward globalization—we address them as
well.
Our bottom line is that regulators at both the national and international
level will have to respond increasingly to market-driven changes. In par-
ticular, as financial institutions delve into a wider range of products and
activities, policymakers almost certainly will have to decide whether they
want to establish a single regulator to oversee all types of financial activity
or whether they will be content with the segmented regulatory system long
in place in some countries, such as the United States. We note that a trend
outside the United States seems to be under way toward creation of a
single national financial regulator, independent of the central bank, a
development we cautiously support. 
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More fundamentally, however, the central challenge that financial regu-
lators, especially those supervising banking activities, will face is how to
deal with the rapid and increasingly complex changes in the financial
arena. Regulators are slowly—too slowly in our view—coming around to
the view that they need help from the market to discipline financial insti-
tutions from taking excessive risks. We outline a plan for accelerating
this process in the banking arena, although we are more circumspect about
the need for international minimum standards for other types of financial
institutions. We are more enthusiastic, however, about efforts to develop
global accounting standards, which we believe would promote efficiency
as well as safety and soundness of financial institutions in countries that
use those standards. We argue that in accounting standards, and other areas
of financial regulation, the advantages of harmonization must be balanced
against the gains from regulatory competition, and we consider approaches
that balance those considerations.
Reshaping the Financial Services Industry: 
A Quick Summary
The financial services industry in the United States historically has
been segmented—by law and to some extent by custom—into different
product lines, notably banking, insurance, securities, mutual funds,
pension funds, and futures. During the past several decades, however, the
walls that separate these segments have been steadily eroding, as mar-
ket participants—with the blessing of federal regulators and state
legislatures—have been exploiting cracks in the seemingly airtight sepa-
rations erected by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 in order to offer a broader array of financial prod-
ucts and services to customers. Indeed, even before the “financial mod-
ernization” legislation enacted by Congress in November 1999, the
merger of Citicorp with Travelers coupled with the entry of various
insurers into the thrift business (through the use or formation of “uni-
tary” thrift holding companies) demonstrated that the “financial super-
market” is already here.
Competition has been the driver in this process, especially through its
effects on regulators’ willingness to support regulatory reform. Competi-
tion forced regulators either to support the modernization trend or, by
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opposing it, to oversee the declining importance of the segments they
controlled.1
Finance is also being transformed by technology, which itself has been
contributing to the intensification of competition. This is not a surprising
development, since financial services firms are among the largest pur-
chasers of information technology software and hardware. The largest
and most sophisticated financial players are using the new technology to
develop a constant flow of new products and instruments, with different
payment streams designed to appeal to investors with different appetites
for risk. Yet perhaps the most powerful technology at work is the Internet,
which is forcing all middlemen—of which financial services firms are
among the most prominent examples—to rethink their business strate-
gies. Among other things, the Internet greatly reduces search costs and
thus squeezes the profit margins of financial product providers. In addition,
it gives increasing numbers of investors virtually direct access to the cap-
ital markets at far lower costs and thus threatens not only to eliminate
securities brokers (and other middlemen) but also to transform the way
new securities are brought to the market and the way securities are traded.2
Aside from the Internet—which is a global phenomenon in itself—
finance has been in the vanguard of globalization, driven by rapidly declin-
ing costs of communication and the continued desire of investors to diver-
sify their risks. There are so many ways to document this trend that we
single out just a few here: the rapid increases in cross-border bank lend-
ing (figure 1), cross-border transactions in bonds and equities (figure 2),
and the volume of new stock issues by foreign issuers in U.S. securities
markets in the 1990s (figure 3). 
Just as financial instruments are moving across borders, so too are
financial service firms themselves, reflecting the broader trend of increas-
ing sums of cross-border foreign direct investment. U.S. banks, for exam-
ple, collectively derive approximately 15 percent of their income from
foreign operations, and for the five largest banks, the share of foreign
profit is much higher at close to 45 percent.3 At the same time, many
foreign financial institutions have become increasingly active in the 
U.S. market; foreign acquisitions of U.S. institutions through mid-1999
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1. Calomiris (1998).
2. This subject was treated extensively in the 1999 issue of the Brookings-Wharton
Papers on Financial Services (Litan and Santomero 1999).
3. Council on Foreign Relations (1999), p. 34.
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totaled $29.6 billion, six times the level of the same period in the preced-
ing year.4
The reshaping of the financial services industry is reflected in, among
other things, the emergence of major global financial powerhouses. 
Table 1 lists the top thirty international banking companies, in order of
their market value at year-end. The table also indicates the total size of
the institutions, as measured by balance sheet assets, as well as the asset
ranking of each institution. This list understates the number and size of the
new global financial powerhouses, since it does not include nonbank firms
such as American International Group, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman
Sachs, which are larger than many of the banking firms on this list. There
is little correlation between the table’s rankings by market value and by
size, which indicates that financial institutions increasingly derive returns
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from their knowledge and “financial brains” rather than from their sheer
financial brawn. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that table 1
excludes such mega-mergers announced in 1999 as the combination of
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Japan. Once
completed, this mega-merger will produce the world’s largest bank, mea-
sured by assets (but not by profits). 
The mergers of financial institutions, and especially banks, in the
United States, Europe, and Japan not surprisingly have aroused populist
concerns about excessive concentration of financial power in the United
States (it is unclear whether similar concerns have been voiced in Europe
and Japan). From a purely antitrust perspective, these concerns have little
basis, except to the extent that financial mergers lead to excessive con-
centration of power within well-defined product or geographic markets.
Where this occurs, antitrust authorities in the United States and Europe,
at least, have conditioned approval of these combinations on divestitures to
address any potential competitive problems. Even in borderline cases
where divestitures have not been mandated (but probably should be), over
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the medium to long run competitive market forces and the potential for
entry should undermine any remaining market monopolization. However,
the formation of financial super-giants does pose important challenges
for prudential regulation that are not so easily overcome. 
Challenges for Prudential Bank Regulation 
Each of the trends just described poses significant challenges to the way
financial institutions, and especially banks, are regulated. 
First, as the walls in the private sector that separate different types of
financial products from one another come tumbling down, the question
naturally arises: why shouldn’t the same be true of the government bodies
that regulate them? More pointedly, if banks are morphing into financial
supermarkets with nationwide (if not global) reach, why shouldn’t their
activities be overseen by a single national financial regulator? 
In fact, a number of countries already have answered this question in
the affirmative. Between 1991 and 1996, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway
each consolidated supervision of all major financial institutions in a single
288 Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 2000
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Table 1.  Top Thirty International Banking Companies, by Market Value, 
1998 and 1999
Billions of U.S. dollars
Market value, Total assets,
as of as of Asset
Bank Country June 30, 1999 December 31, 1998 rank
Citigroup United States 160.8 668.6 3
Bank of America United States 127.9 617.7 4
HSBC Holdings United Kingdom 99.3 482.9 8
Lloyds TSB Group United Kingdom 73.8 279.3 17
Chase Manhattan United States 73.1 365.9 13
Wells Fargo United States 70.7 202.5 21
Bank One United States 70.3 261.5 18
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Japan 66.6 579.8 5
UBS Switzerland 61.7 687.4 2
ING Belgium 47.6 463.6 10
Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 47.1 475.0 9
First Union United States 45.6 237.4 20
National Westminster Bank United Kingdom 44.4 . . .
Sumitomo Bank Japan 39.0 428.0 11
Banco Santander Central 
Hispano Spain 35.9 182.0 22
Barclays United Kingdom 35.6 365.1 14
Deutsche Bank Germany 35.4 735.2 1
Fortis Group Belgium 33.0 323.6 15
Abbey National United Kingdom 31.7 295.6 16
ABN-AMRO Holdings Netherlands 29.9 507.2 7
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 28.7 157.3 23
Sanwa Bank Japan 28.6 418.4 12
Bank of New York United States 27.9 . . .
Fleet Financial Group United States 25.3 104.6 25
J. P. Morgan United States 24.9 261.1 19
MBNA United States 24.6 . . .
Bank of Scotland United Kingdom 24.4 99.4 26
National Australia Bank Australia 24.3 149.6 24
U.S. Bancorp United States 24.3 76.4 27
Bayerische Hypotheken und 
Vereinsbank Group Germany 24.1 540.9 6
Source: American Banker, various issues.
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agency. Japan recently did so as well, in large part because of the well-pub-
licized failures of the Ministry of Finance to deal with the country’s finan-
cial problems. But perhaps the most publicized move in this direction
was taken by the United Kingdom in May 1997, shortly after the election
of Tony Blair as prime minister. In one of his first official acts, Blair not
only combined supervision of banking, securities, and insurance opera-
tions in a single agency, the Financial Services Authority, but also split off
the banking supervisory function from the Bank of England.5 In 1998 Aus-
tralia followed suit with a similar system, keeping responsibility for the
payments system in the central bank but reorganizing the regulation of
institutional safety and soundness and consumer protection, respectively, as
separate functions within the new, consolidated supervisory agency.6
The decline of central bank control over banking is a natural conse-
quence of the consolidation of financial supervision in a single agency,
since central banks historically have no expertise in the businesses of
insurance and securities with which banks in these countries are now
allied. Nonetheless, the United States stands as an exception to the emerg-
ing trend: the Federal Reserve System argued (successfully) throughout
the congressional debate over financial modernization that all newly autho-
rized nonbanking operations must be carried out through nonbank sub-
sidiaries of bank holding companies, which the Federal Reserve alone
supervises. In addition, the Fed continues to maintain that its functions as
the nation’s monetary authority cannot be carried out effectively unless the
agency also retains its role as a bank supervisor. We address this argument,
among others, in the next section of the paper.
Continuing advances in technology have posed a different set of chal-
lenges for domestic and international regulation alike. The proliferation
of financial instruments, coupled with innovative investing and trading
strategies, keeps financial institutions several steps ahead of regulators
who inevitably lag in gaining the requisite expertise required to assess the
new risks. Indeed, U.S. regulators—and later the regulators of other indus-
290 Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 2000
5. Primary responsibility for each of the different segments, however, technically
remains lodged in a subunit of the Financial Services Authority. 
6. The Australian system bears some similarity to the proposal by Steven Wallman
advanced in the 1999 Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, which would split
responsibility for prudential matters, consumer protection, and avoiding systemic risk
among the existing financial regulatory bodies within the United States. See Wallman
(1999), pp. 207–27. 
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trial countries belonging to the Basel Committee—recognized as much
when they recently decided to allow banks to use their own models for
assessing trading risks rather than specifying a one-size-fits-all model for
this purpose. At the same time, the rapid pace of technological change
illustrates the limits of international bodies like the Basel Committee to
prescribe detailed rules for bank supervision and regulation. It is difficult
enough for regulators in each country, acting alone, to stay abreast of new
developments. It is even more challenging for regulators from different
countries to agree on common methods of doing so.
The complexity of the financial marketplace also poses significant
uncertainties that complicate the lives of financial supervisors. Although it
is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits and drawbacks 
of the Federal Reserve’s involvement in the private sector rescue of 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), the near failure of LTCM
dramatically highlighted the limited information and understanding that
regulators, let alone supposedly sophisticated financial institutions, have
about the risks involved in large derivatives transactions.7 Indeed, the Fed
justified its intervention because of fears that a forced unwinding of
LTCM’s derivatives trades, coupled with defensive reactions to that
process by other market participants, could cause undesirable systemic
effects in the markets.8 Although lenders since reportedly have tightened
up their lending to hedge funds (on their initiative and at the urging of bank
regulators), it is a reasonable assumption that continuing advances in
financial technologies, instruments, and trading strategies will leave regu-
lators and private actors somewhat in the dark about the resiliency of the
overall financial system in the face of sudden, negative shocks in the
future. Securitization of bank loans poses similar problems, as it permits
banks to generate hard-to-measure contingent liabilities through off-
balance-sheet transactions.9
Meanwhile, the consolidation of the financial services industry—
especially the emergence of a growing number of “mega” institutions—
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7. Although it has been widely remarked that few observers saw an LTCM-style collapse
coming, it is noteworthy that Stephen Figlewski presciently highlighted in Brookings-
Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 1998—published three months before the LTCM
episode—the uncertainties involved in modeling risks of derivatives transactions. See
Figlewski (1998). 
8. For an excellent guide to the events surrounding the LTCM affair, see Edwards (1999).
9. Jones (1998); Mingo (1998).
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poses the risk that the regulatory authorities will deem a larger number of
institutions, bank or nonbank, as “too big to fail.” More precisely, an insti-
tution is too big to fail if regulators feel compelled to bail out its uninsured
depositors and other creditors should the institution run into financial dif-
ficulties. One observer who has voiced this fear, Thomas Hoenig, president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, is skeptical that market dis-
cipline can prevent this result. Instead, he argues that the only remedy is
more effective and watchful regulation.10 Recently, Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Greenspan signaled that bank regulators would need to tailor
capital standards for large, complex institutions, taking into account their
own internal risk models to be sure, but at bottom adopting a micro-
regulatory approach.11 We have a very different view: if anything, faced
with weakened institutions, regulators will be tempted to exercise for-
bearance (as bank regulators did with large money center banks in the
1980s). As we outline below, this result can and should be avoided, at least
with respect to large banks, by relying on a system of credible market dis-
cipline implemented through a mandatory subordinated debt requirement.
The subjects of technology and consolidation bring us to the implica-
tions of globalization for financial supervision. The issue first surfaced in
1974 with the failure of a medium-size German bank, Bankhaus Herstatt,
that had significant foreign currency exposures to other European and
American banks. The bank’s failure triggered fears of a domino-like chain
reaction of solvency problems in each of its major counterparties and
briefly interrupted the markets for foreign exchange and interbank lending.
The cross-border “externalities” of the Herstatt failure awoke the central
banks of the Group of Ten (actually eleven industrial countries) to the need
for at least coordinating the responses of bank supervisors in different
countries and for setting some minimum ground rules for supervision. In
1975 these central banks formed the Standing Committee on Banking Reg-
ulation and Supervisory Practices—since named the Basel Committee—to
agree on principles of bank supervision. The initial version of this “con-
cordat” established the principle that the country of a parent bank has
primary responsibility for ensuring its solvency and the solvency of its
subsidiaries and branches in foreign countries. The concordat was revised
292 Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 2000
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several years later to permit national bank supervisors (including central
banks) to exchange sensitive information about their banks. Significant for
the purposes of this paper, this revision also recognized the importance of
supervising international banks on a “consolidated” basis, taking into
account both banking and nonbanking activities.12 We suspect that the Fed-
eral Reserve today relies on this concordat, among other things, to justify
its oversight of the diverse activities of the emerging financial conglom-
erates in the United States.
By the 1980s the Basel Committee moved beyond attempts to coordi-
nate the flow of information by setting minimum capital standards for
banks. The committee was led to this result by the confluence of two
forces. One was the significant deterioration during the 1980s of the finan-
cial condition of many large multinational banks that had outstanding,
but unpaid, sovereign loans to developing countries. There was at least an
unspoken fear that the failure of one or more of these institutions could
have undesirable spillover effects across national borders. The other pow-
erful force was the desire by U.S. banks in particular not to be subject to
stiffer capital rules than those applying to their competitors overseas, espe-
cially banks in Japan, where the authorities allowed banks to count as an
asset the value of appreciated equity they held in other companies (typi-
cally their large borrowers). 
When it finally acted, the committee established “risk-based” capital
standards for large, multinational banks that required assets in various
categories to be supported by different percentages of capital. In fact, the
committee defined two levels of capital, requiring that banks maintain 
Tier I capital (consisting primarily of common equity) of at least 4 per-
cent of risk-weighted assets and a sum of Tier I and Tier II capital (where
Tier II capital includes instruments such as preferred stock and subordi-
nated debt) of at least 8 percent. The different risk weights meant that, at
one extreme, bank investments in sovereign debt issued by Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governments
required no capital backing, loans to other banks (which were subject to a
20 percent risk weight) required Tier I capital of just 0.8 percent of risk-
weighted assets and total capital of 1.6 percent, investments in residential
mortgages (carrying a 50 percent risk weight) required Tier I capital of 
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2 percent and total capital of 4 percent, and most other loans had to be
backed by the full 4 percent of Tier I capital and 8 percent of total capital.
The Basel Committee was aware that the initial standards were crude in
that they took no account of other types of risk to which a bank was
exposed, such as interest rate risk arising from the mismatching of matu-
rities of assets and liabilities, managerial risks, and market risks. In the
years since the initial standards were announced, the committee accord-
ingly has attempted gradually to add refinements to deal with at least mar-
ket risks. Most recently, in June 1999, the committee announced a sweep-
ing proposal to overhaul the risk weights, which we discuss and criticize
below. Even this proposal, however, stopped short of addressing a major
conceptual flaw in the standards. By assigning different capital require-
ments to different asset “buckets,” the proposal took no account of the
risks of a bank’s overall portfolio, which according to modern finance
theory should be the central focus of regulatory attention. 
It is noteworthy that the Basel standards were adopted by and so far
apply only to the developed countries that participated in the process. In
the mid-1990s, the G-7 countries called on the committee to stimulate
improvements in banking supervision in emerging-market countries as
well. Ironically, the committee released the results of its efforts in this
area—its core principles for effective banking supervision—in Septem-
ber 1997, or just two months after a bank failure in Thailand triggered the
Asian financial crisis. The core principles urge emerging-market countries
to adopt and enforce minimum capital standards that are modeled on 
the Basel standards but modified to take account of the greater volatility 
in asset prices in those economies. This translates into a call for even
higher minimum bank capital standards in most, if not all, emerging-
market countries.
Several lessons can be drawn from the Basel process. First, just a few
nations are the main driving forces behind the contents of the standards.
It is conventional wisdom, for example, that the Basel Committee—which
had been debating the original standards for several years in the 1980s
without making significant progress toward consensus—was finally
induced to adopt its original standards after the United States and the
United Kingdom separately reached their own accord. Meanwhile,
Germany was influential in gaining a discounted risk weight for mort-
gage loans (which survives to this day) and also held up the most recent
proposal to ensure favorable treatment for its banks’ mortgages.
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Second, concerns about ensuring a level playing field among banks
from different countries have played as important a role in developing the
standards as the desire to ensure safety and soundness. Indeed, policy-
makers in the United States in particular were strongly motivated by their
desire not to put American banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
foreign banks.
Third, the Basel Committee, composed of representatives of central
banks, has displayed a clear tendency, through its adoption and continued
adherence to risk weights for different categories of assets and off-balance-
sheet obligations, to micro-manage the risk profiles of banks. We believe
this bias against relying more heavily on market assessments should be
corrected and, at the very least, not be reinforced, as would be the case if
the recently proposed revisions to the Basel standards were adopted in
their current form. 
Fourth, whatever one may think of the standards themselves, the Basel
process has one glaring and uncontroversial flaw: there is no international
mechanism for enforcing the standards. The Basel Committee is, after
all, just that—a committee—and not an international regulatory authority
with supervening authority over national regulators. Indeed, the movement
in many countries to separate central banks from the domestic bank regu-
latory process is further distancing the members of the Basel Committee
(which is dominated by central bank representatives) from the regulatory
implementation of bank capital standards within their own countries.
Nor is it likely any time soon that a supra-national regulator will come
into being (despite the suggestions of some observers, such as Henry
Kaufman, that one should).13 As a result, national members of the Basel
Committee may pay fealty to the standards but, if they so desire for domes-
tic reasons, ignore or fail to enforce them with vigor. 
The problem of weak enforcement is perhaps best illustrated by the fail-
ure of regulators, until recently, to come to grips with banking problems in
Japan. The Ministry of Finance had exercised forbearance in not forcing
weakened Japanese banks to establish loan loss reserves commensurate
with the market values of much of the loan portfolios. In following that
course, the Japanese authorities followed the example of the United States
Charles W. Calomiris and Robert E. Litan 295
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in the 1980s, when regulators and legislators engaged in forbearance
extensively with the aim of allowing weak savings institutions and com-
mercial banks time to recover. The policy was a clear failure for thrifts, and
debate continues over its effectiveness for banks.14 In any event, in 1991
Congress was sufficiently persuaded that forbearance was a bad idea that
it attempted to prohibit the practice by instituting a system of “prompt cor-
rective action” that imposes progressively stiffer penalties on banks and
their managers as capital declines.15
International Regulation of Nonbank Financial Services 
Although not as well developed as the Basel process, several interna-
tional initiatives have been under way for addressing cross-border issues
raised by other financial services. The counterpart to the Basel Commit-
tee for the securities industry, for example, is the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). IOSCO sets broad capital guide-
lines, encouraging national governments to base capital requirements on
risk. These guidelines have been published in a series of technical papers
that compare different national practices but do not set forth in numerical
detail—as do the Basel standards for banks—the minimum capital
required for securities firms in all member countries. IOSCO also has
urged the world’s accounting bodies to develop a set of common account-
ing standards so that issuers can easily sell their stock in multiple markets
around the world. We have more to say about this effort below.
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is the
most recently formed international financial regulatory body, launched in
1994. It too has a broad membership, consisting of insurance regulators
from more than 100 countries. Like its banking and securities counterparts,
the IAIS started cautiously, facilitating the exchange of information about
296 Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 2000
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best insurance regulatory practices among national regulators. In October
1996, however, the organization began to develop some common insurance
regulatory principles. It has since issued a number of papers setting out
broad concepts for regulators in both developed and emerging-market
countries. Although it is at work on the subject, IAIS has not yet 
issued minimum prudential standards for insurers, analogous to those 
that the Basel Committee has designed for banks. It is safe to say that if
IAIS reaches consensus on these standards, it too will face the same prob-
lems that the Basel Committee and IOSCO have encountered in ensuring
that national regulators enforce the standards.
As part of various initiatives following the Asian crisis, the G-7 finance
ministers took one other step in February 1999 worth noting. They cre-
ated the Financial Stability Forum, consisting of representatives from the
finance ministries, central banks, and relevant national supervisors of the
G-7 countries, as well as representatives of each of the international regu-
latory bodies just mentioned (Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS) and the
international financial institutions (World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund). The stated purpose of the forum is to identify vulnerabilities
affecting the global financial system and actions that might address them,
as well as to facilitate coordination among the various national regulatory
bodies in the event of future crises. It is too early to assess how influen-
tial or successful the forum will be.
Finally, although not directly involved in prudential regulation, the
activities of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)
ultimately may turn out to be among the most important of the interna-
tional activities affecting the safety and soundness of financial institutions.
Accounting standards are the unsung heroes of financial systems: without
accurate information about the condition of firms, investors and lenders
will be unable to allocate capital among projects and firms efficiently.16
The IASC, whose members consist of professional accounting bodies from
around the world, was formed in 1973. Its purpose is the most ambitious of
all of the international bodies just surveyed: to develop a common set of
accounting principles accepted by securities exchanges and regulators in
all countries. In short, IASC’s objective is not to create minimum account-
ing standards, but to create harmonized standards. 
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In fact, IASC is well on its way to achieving this objective. IASC has
completed virtually all of the standards it set out to develop, and these
standards are now accepted by most of the world’s stock exchanges,
including those in Europe, Singapore, Australia, and Japan. The notable
exceptions are exchanges in Canada and the United States—where the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) continues to require the use
of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) but permits foreign
issuers to reconcile their statements prepared under IASC standards to
GAAP. This has not gone unnoticed. In 1996 Congress required the SEC
to report on the outlook for the completion of international accounting
standards that would be acceptable for offerings and listings by foreign
corporations in our markets. Two years earlier, IOSCO set out a similar
objective when it announced that it would consider recommending the
use of IASC standards, once completed, for use in cross-border listing
and trading. 
Because the SEC plays an integral role in IOSCO, the commission effec-
tively will determine when IOSCO makes its recommendation. Further-
more, because greater efforts are made in the United States than elsewhere
to ensure that issuers are complying with accounting standards, if and when
the SEC does accept IASC standards, it is likely that, as long as the enforce-
ment efforts of other countries lag those of the United States, the SEC will
become the de facto worldwide accounting enforcement body.
An Agenda for Prudential Financial Regulation 
in the United States and the European Community
Before outlining what we believe is an appropriate direction for global
or multinational financial regulation in the future, we discuss briefly an
appropriate agenda for prudential regulation both within the United States
and the European Union (EU). There are both practical and political rea-
sons for this. As leaders in the global markets, the United States and the
EU take actions that set powerful precedents for what should happen
worldwide. At the same time, both jurisdictions face important regulatory
challenges, which must be confronted regardless of what happens inter-
nationally and also are very much related to one another. 
As the financial world comes to be heavily influenced, if not dominated,
by international conglomerates offering a full menu of financial services,
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tensions between regulatory structures in different countries are likely to
become increasingly evident. Whereas European nations, Australia, and
Japan have moved toward consolidating financial supervision in a single
agency, distinct from the central bank, the United States remains an excep-
tion. Not only is the Fed heavily involved in bank supervision—and indeed
has been given broader regulatory purview over new nonbanking activities
that Congress has authorized for financial holding companies—but the
American financial regulatory system remains highly fragmented. Func-
tional responsibilities for securities, futures, and banking activities are
divided up not only among federal regulators (three in the case of banks),
but among the states as well. Insurance, which increasingly is international
in scope, is regulated only at the state level in the United States. 
Europe has its own regulatory issues to address as well. Although most
national members of the EU have moved toward consolidated supervision
within each country, financial supervision has yet to be consolidated at the
EU level itself. Instead, financial supervisors in EU member states oper-
ate under a regime of informal coordination. The same is true of supervi-
sory authorities within EU countries that are separate from their national
central banks. EU law allows supervisors to exchange information with the
monetary authorities but leaves the degree of cooperation between the
two to be resolved at the discretion of each member state.
The decentralization of EU regulatory and supervisory authority (where,
since 1992, EU-based financial institutions operate throughout the EU under
a single passport) stands in sharp contrast to the consolidation of monetary
policy authority within the European Central Bank (ECB). Indeed, on the
surface, the ECB would appear to be an appropriate vehicle for centralizing
regulatory and supervisory authority over financial conglomerates. But that
move would be inconsistent with the trend at the member level to divorce the
role of central banks in monetary policy from their supervisory function.17
Major questions about the ECB’s role, therefore, remain unanswered. For
example, the ECB has yet to specify its role as a lender-of-last-resort to
deal with systemic crises. It is frequently heard that the ECB has this author-
ity implicitly under its charter, but ambiguity remains.
In short, three separate but related questions naturally arise when look-
ing at prudential regulation of financial institutions in both the United
States and Europe:
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—To what extent is it desirable to consolidate regulation and supervi-
sion across financial activities pursued by the same enterprise?
—Within national or regional boundaries, should regulatory functions
be monopolized? Should all financial conglomerates be supervised and
regulated by a single national regulator (in the case of the United States) or
by a single pan-European regulator (in the case of the EU)?
—If so, should that regulator be the central bank or an entity indepen-
dent of the central bank?
There are several arguments for consolidating supervision and regula-
tion across activities so that only one regulator has responsibility for any
one financial conglomerate. First, the subject matters of regulation—
solvency and consumer protection—are similar across financial products
and services, and thus there may be economies of scope (or at least not
very large diseconomies of scope) in having a single regulator. 
Another motive for combined regulation is the need to limit risk trans-
ference among related affiliates. Links among related entities can make the
health of one subsidiary dependent on the fortunes of another. A prudential
bank regulator will want to enforce lending limits from government-
insured banks to nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates (as under sections 23a
and 23b of the Federal Reserve Act in the United States) as a means of lim-
iting the abuse of government safety net protection by subsidiaries and
affiliates. Those rules allow regulators to enforce inter-affiliate lending
restrictions to prevent banks from extending too much credit to weakened
affiliates. 
The safety net argument, however, does not imply a need for the same
regulatory body to have responsibility for all aspects of supervision and
regulation. Enforcing prudential bank standards requires only limited over-
sight of bank affiliates (essentially regulating and monitoring financial
flows among them). In particular, one should not exaggerate the extent of
externalities between bank and nonbank affiliates or derive from those sup-
posed externalities a need for “umbrella” regulation. Would a failure of,
say, the insurance affiliate of a large banking conglomerate cause a panic
run on the affiliated bank? Does that risk warrant limits by bank regulators
on the risks taken by insurance affiliates? 
In general, we would answer “no” to both questions. Banks would be
safe from runs as long as regulators enforce bank capital standards and
the limits on inter-affiliate financial flows and make that clear to uninsured
debt holders of banks. The need to police inter-affiliate transactions does
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not, by itself, justify more intrusive “umbrella” regulation of the affiliates
themselves. Many aspects of nonbank affiliate activity—professional stan-
dards for brokers and dealers, rules governing trading, and disclosure rules
for securities offerings—might be better left to a different regulator.
Indeed, there may be competitive advantages to allowing firms to choose
among various potential regulators, to the extent that separating regulatory
functions is feasible.
That consideration brings us to our second question—whether “con-
solidated” regulatory and supervisory authority should be vested in a sin-
gle, monopolist regulator or in competing regulators (each of which, for
example, might be the prudential regulator of different conglomerates). A
benefit of regulatory monopoly is the avoidance of regulatory “turf wars,”
such as the struggle in the United States between the Treasury Depart-
ment and the Federal Reserve over the appropriate location of nonbank-
ing operations (whether in bank or holding company subsidiaries) or the
haggling between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
and the SEC over the range of products that fall under the purview of each
authority. Such turf battles create undesirable regulatory risks, which raise
the costs of financial services (by limiting the activities banks are willing
to pursue in their subsidiaries or by encouraging complicated offshore
booking of transactions to avoid regulatory risks in the over-the-counter
market). 
There are powerful arguments, however, against vesting all regulatory
authority for financial institutions in a single regulator. One regulator can
become ossified in its approach to regulation, especially in a dynamic
industry such as the financial services industry. Thus the problems asso-
ciated with turf fights between regulators have to be weighed against the
potential advantages of regulatory competition. Kenneth Scott has made
a persuasive case even for dual bank regulation in the United States, which
allows banks to choose between having a state or a national charter. He
argues that the competition between state and national regulators leads to
more regulatory flexibility.18 Financial historians lend empirical support to
that argument.19 Critics respond that competition between regulators might
result in a “race to the bottom,” or a so-called competition in laxity. This
debate remains unsettled, at least in the academic literature.
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The case in favor of regulatory competition, however, is especially
strong for nonprudential supervision and regulation. Roberta Romano
argues that in the areas of disclosure, professional standards, and the like,
competition among regulators will produce more efficient regulatory stan-
dards.20 Regulatees have strong incentives to choose efficient sets of rules,
because doing so attracts more customers from competitors. In prudential
regulation of government-insured banks, the same argument applies, but
only so long as banks face market discipline that penalizes bank choices of
inefficient (permissive) regulatory authorities. Where uninsured bank debt
holders (and therefore banks) do not pay the price for the inadequacies of
safety net regulation, a regulatory race to the bottom (to maximize tax-
payer subsidies for risk taking) is conceivable if regulatory competition is
allowed.21 Our proposal for incorporating market discipline into the pru-
dential capital standards outlined below therefore has an advantage in
addition to reducing safety net losses under the current regime; it enhances
the desirability of opening up the bank regulatory process to greater
competition.
Will these normative considerations about the proper way to organize
regulatory authority guide the actual process of regulation? Not exactly.
The compromise reached between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
Board in October 1999—which helped to pave the way for the financial
modernization bill enacted shortly thereafter—resolved the turf war
between the two regulators over where new financial activities would be
located and how they would be regulated on quasi-political grounds. 
Specifically, the compromise allows securities underwriting and agency
activities to be carried out by bank subsidiaries or affiliates. Insurance under-
writing and real estate development can only be conducted by an affiliate
and thus a subsidiary of a financial holding company. Merchant banking is
off-limits to bank subsidiaries for five years, and thereafter, the Fed and the
Treasury will jointly decide whether to lift that prohibition. Furthermore,
from the outset, both agencies would share responsibility for determining
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what is a “financial” activity that can be carried out by either a bank sub-
sidiary or an affiliate.
To some extent, it can be argued that the division of activities between
bank subsidiaries and affiliates reflects an assessment of the comparative
riskiness of those activities. Arguably, securities underwriting and vari-
ous agency activities are less risky than insurance underwriting and real
estate development, and for that reason, the Fed (through its influence on
the Congress) most likely agreed to having them carried out within bank
subsidiaries. At the same time, the power-sharing arrangement between the
Fed and the Treasury for deciding what is “financial” and when banks
can enter merchant banking clearly was a purely political compromise. 
In the end, therefore, the financial modernization bill left regulatory
responsibilities in the United States largely untouched. Each of the con-
stituent parts of financial conglomerates will continue to be regulated
separately. Importantly, however, the Fed will have the equivalent of
“backstop” consolidated supervision over those holding companies that
are also engaged in insurance underwriting and real estate development,
but will not have such authority over banks that locate their new authori-
ties as subsidiaries. Furthermore, the unitary thrift holding companies
that were grandfathered by the bill will continue to have no consolidated
regulator, while the SEC and the CFTC will continue to oversee the secu-
rities and futures markets, respectively.
Meanwhile, the key question in Europe is not whether single national
financial regulators will emerge—they already have—but whether regula-
tors will act on a pan-European basis. Our prediction is that as European
financial markets become more integrated, pressures will grow to consol-
idate supervision over financial conglomerates doing business within
Europe in a single regulator. If those pressures produce a single pan-
European regulator, should that regulator be the ECB?
This question brings us to the third question we posed about regula-
tory structure: should central banks play important roles as regulators and
supervisors of financial conglomerates? We think there are strong argu-
ments against entrusting the regulation of financial conglomerates to cen-
tral banks, which apply with equal force to the ECB and the Fed.
First, and most important, to the extent that central banks have any
regulatory or supervisory expertise, it is confined to the banking industry.
No central bank, to our knowledge, regulates or supervises nonbank finan-
cial institutions. In principle, the ECB (or the Fed) could acquire the rele-
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vant nonbank expertise if the regulatory institutions now charged with that
responsibility (principally insurance and securities regulators) were folded
into the central bank. Given the entrenched bureaucratic interests (backed
by the regulated industries) in having these nonbank regulators remain
independent, however, we view the possibility of a central bank “regula-
tory takeover” as highly remote in the United States. We are less confi-
dent this is true for Europe, however.
Second, the central bank has an inherent conflict of interest if it is charged
both with conducting monetary policy and supervising financial institutions.
As Clive Briault, director of Central Policy at the new Financial Services
Authority in the United Kingdom, has persuasively argued, weakness in
the financial sector can tempt a central bank with supervisory authority
over financial institutions to pursue a looser monetary policy than it would
otherwise follow, imparting an inflationary bias.22 Also, central banks may
be tempted to use their regulatory authority as a macroeconomic tool and
so compromise their proper regulatory objectives. For example, in the 1980s
many banks held large amounts of developing-country debt, and it is widely
believed that regulators exercised forbearance in applying capital standards
because they feared the potential macroeconomic consequences of exposing
the banks’financial weakness to the public. Meanwhile, during the Brazilian
crisis in 1998, some believe that large banks were pressured to roll over
existing debts to reduce the risk of exchange rate collapse in Brazil, again
in pursuit of a wider macroeconomic objective.
Third, a central bank’s supervisory failings can detract from the credi-
bility of its monetary policies. In the limit, these failings can lead politi-
cal authorities to rein in the independence of the central bank. On the heels
of its embarrassing lapses in the failures of the Bank of Commerce and
Credit International and of Barings, the Bank of England may have antic-
ipated that danger, which may explain its quiescence in having its bank
supervisory authority transferred to the new Financial Services Authority.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the Federal Reserve suffered unusually
strong criticism from Congress over its intervention in the rescue of
LTCM. Had the Fed’s chairman, Alan Greenspan, not been held in such
high repute by the Congress, the president, and the public, Congress might
have been able to use that intervention to support limiting some of the
Fed’s cherished independence. 
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We have seen only two counterarguments for having central banks
involved in bank supervision. One is the claimed need to have ready access
to financial information about specific banks should they ask for lender-of-
last-resort assistance. A related defense is that central banks will find it
much easier to twist the arms of banks to lend to specific sectors (or firms)
in the middle of a financial crisis when the banks know that they must
also submit to the regulatory supervision of the central bank. A prime
example is when the Federal Reserve strongly encouraged U.S. banks to
continue lending to large securities houses immediately after the October
1987 stock market crash.
We believe that these are weak pillars on which to rest the case for pru-
dential supervision being carried out by central banks. First, it is contro-
versial whether central banks should be involved at all in extending credit
to specific banks in a crisis. Many economists argue that the monetary
authority can discharge its lender-of-last-resort responsibilities, without
creating problems of moral hazard, by providing general liquidity sup-
port to the market as a whole through normal, open market operations
(which is what the central bank did after the October 1987 stock market
crash, for example).23 The counter to that view is that the discount win-
dow can provide useful, targeted “pass-through” assistance to nonbank
credit markets, as occurred during the Penn Central crisis of 1970.24 But
even if the discount window is worth preserving, to the extent the central
bank needs financial information quickly about specific banks, such data
are only a phone call away. In the United States, for example, the Fed
could rely on either the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for such informa-
tion. It is hard to believe that the Fed would be denied such information
from either organization; if it were truly needed, the information would
be at the Fed’s fingertips. 
As for the supposed need to vest central banks with “arm-twisting”
authority, we emphasize that arm-twisting can be used to pressure banks
into policies that are contrary to the proper goals of prudential regulation.
Furthermore, arm-twisting is not necessary to encourage banks to pass
through liquidity during a financial crisis. Bank access to inexpensive
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funds (discount lending, specifically earmarked for pass-through, as dur-
ing the Penn Central crisis) is a sufficient inducement for banks to pass
through liquidity. 
Ideally, bank regulation should be done by competing, independent
agencies (one could envision the creation of a more politically independent
OCC to regulate national banks and a more politically independent FDIC
to regulate state banks, with banks choosing between the two by selecting
their type of charter). The sole purpose and sole interest of these ideal
regulators would be to perform their regulatory tasks properly. In the end,
however, we would be surprised if the regulatory role of central banks in
Europe or the United States were determined on the basis of the kind of
analytic arguments we have just made. In the United States, the prospect of
removing regulatory power from the Fed seems remote. In Europe, it is
potentially important that the only significant pan-European official
financial body now in place is the ECB. That it may not have all of 
the relevant expertise today probably will not stop the powers-that-be from
eventually giving the central bank at least what might be labeled “backstop”
regulatory authority over all of the activities of financial conglomerates.
By “backstop” authority we have in mind that the existing national
regulators would continue to act as the front-line supervisors of the finan-
cial intermediaries over which they now have authority. However, the
central bank would reserve the right to step in with its own more inten-
sive examinations of the bank, or nonbank, portions of financial conglom-
erates it believed to be weakly capitalized (in Europe, where universal
banking is much the norm, the conglomerates and the banks are one and
the same). Over time, if certain banks run into trouble with some of their
nonbanking operations, we would expect the ECB to become increas-
ingly aggressive about stepping in—call it creeping “über-regulation,” if
you will. We further suspect that the same would be true in the United
States for whichever regulatory body ends up with primary supervisory
authority over nonbanking operations—the OCC, the Fed, or even a new
independent regulator (as the United Kingdom has done).25
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To sum up, our consideration of the likely trends in the structure of
regulation lead us to several key conclusions.
First, a good case can be made for consolidating some financial
regulation and supervision, but that case does not imply mandatory con-
solidation of all dimensions of regulation or the creation of a regulatory
monopolist. In particular, it may be desirable to require all the prudential
bank regulation and supervision of any particular conglomerate to be
carried out by a single regulator, including enforcement of limits on finan-
cial flows between banks and nonbank affiliates. But one should not leap
too quickly from that conclusion to argue for mandatory consolidation of
nonprudential regulation or the creation of regulatory monopolies. 
Second, the argument for competition among regulators (chosen by
conglomerates to regulate them) strikes us as important and worthy of
greater attention than it has received. Particularly in the areas of nonpru-
dential regulation, competition among regulators—in setting and enforc-
ing rules for securities offerings, broker and dealer professional standards,
and laws governing trading on and off foreign exchanges—is likely to lead
to the adoption of efficient regulatory standards. 
Third, the case for allowing prudential bank regulators to compete (to
generate similar efficient gains from competition) is strengthened if mar-
ket discipline can be incorporated into bank capital standards. If so, then
uninsured bank creditors (and thus banks) would internalize the benefits of
efficient prudential regulation, and a race to the bottom in prudential stan-
dards would be avoided. However, if market discipline is lacking,
competition among regulators with discretion to either set or enforce
prudential standards could exacerbate risks of safety net abuse. Below we
discuss a means to establish that market discipline.
Fourth, although there may be large potential advantages from “har-
monizing” standards—especially accounting standards, securities disclo-
sure requirements, professional standards, and so forth—we do not think
harmonization should be (or needs to be) mandated. If different regula-
tory standards compete with each other—that is, if firms are free to choose
which kinds of accounting standards or disclosure standards they wish to
operate under and if those decisions are made clear to the public—then
greater regulatory efficiency would result. In fact, we believe there is a
good chance not only that harmonization ultimately would result from this
competitive process but also that the gains from standardization probably
would accelerate the adoption of a single best-practice technique. We
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return to this theme at the end of the paper with specific recommenda-
tions about rules governing the use of accounting standards.
Fifth, it is desirable to separate financial regulation from monetary pol-
icy, and thus we support moving regulatory authority out of central banks.
Sixth, developments within the United States and the EU suggest that,
nonetheless, consolidation of regulation is taking place and that central
banks’ regulatory powers are at least as likely to increase as to shrink. 
International Prudential Financial Regulation: Next Steps 
However the regulatory issues within Europe and the United States ulti-
mately are resolved, the international financial agenda will continue to be
dominated by efforts to refine the existing international bank capital stan-
dards (the Basel standards) as well as by efforts to institutionalize similar
standards for the insurance and securities industry. Indeed, at this writing,
the Basel Committee is accepting comments on a proposal to revise the
minimum bank capital standards, with an announced intention to take final
action later in 2000. Given the fact that the Basel standards are the most
developed of the global financial standards, we concentrate in this section
on proposed revisions to the banking standards, although we also offer
some concluding thoughts about ongoing efforts in other arenas.26
Recognized Shortcomings of the Basel Standards 
and Attempts to Address Them 
The Asian financial crisis as well as recent developments in the financial
marketplace have exposed several problems with the Basel standards, as
the committee itself has recognized. One of the most widely recognized
shortcomings is the fact that the current standards assign only a 20 per-
cent risk weight to short-term interbank lending, even when conducted in
currencies other than that of the country in which the borrowing bank
resides. In retrospect, many observers believe that the lower risk weight
attached to such lending encouraged large internationally active banks,
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especially those from Japan that were already in weak condition, to lend
excessively in short maturities to borrowers in Southeast Asia and Russia. 
A related, recognized shortcoming is that the current standards assign
a zero risk weight to all sovereign debt of countries that belong to the
OECD. Although the recent Asian crisis did not involve sovereign debt,
such debt did play a role in the Mexican financial and currency crisis of
1994–95.
A third recognized problem with the current standards is that, apart
from the 50 percent risk weight they give to mortgage loans and the 20 per-
cent weight they assign to interbank lending, they assign 100 percent risk
weights to all other types of lending, regardless of differences in risk. 
In other words, loans to highly leveraged companies or risky commercial
real estate projects are weighted no differently than loans to the 
safest companies or individuals. By this criticism we do not mean to 
imply that the risk weights ought to be fine-tuned, but rather we simply
wish to make the point that as long as a system of risk weights is used, it
inevitably will be arbitrary and tend not to reflect accurately commercial
realities.
A fourth problem that has troubled the Basel Committee for some 
time is the ease with which banks can “game” the standards—that is,
reshuffle their balance sheets so as to minimize regulatory capital. One
increasingly popular way for banks to do this is through asset securitiza-
tions, which remove loans from balance sheets and thereby lower the
amount of required capital but still may entail some sharing of risks by
the banks.27
Finally, the Basel Committee has been troubled by the increasingly
rapid pace of change in the markets as well as the increasing complexity of
banking operations. For this reason the committee abandoned its effort in
the early 1990s to specify particular models for calculating capital require-
ments to reflect interest rate risk of bank portfolios and instead allowed
banks themselves to choose their own “internal” models.28 Accordingly,
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the committee has appeared interested in incorporating some types of mar-
ket signals into any revisions of its standards. 
In June 1999 the committee outlined a series of proposed changes to the
standards that ostensibly are designed to meet each of these concerns.29
The proposal has several major elements:
—To address the interbank lending problem, the committee proposed
tying the capital charge for short-term foreign currency loans to a specific
bank to the credit ratings assigned by rating agencies to the sovereign
debt issued by the government in the country where the borrowing bank
is located. Accordingly, lending banks would be required to set aside more
capital when depositing money in banks in high-risk countries than when
depositing funds in banks in countries where sovereign debt carries a lower
risk weighting.
—To remedy the problem posed by uniformity of risk weightings, the
committee proposed varying the risk weights on assets according to the
credit ratings assigned to the borrowing companies. The highest-quality
loans would receive a 20 percent risk weight, the lowest-risk loans would
carry a 150 percent risk weight. An open question is whether the commit-
tee will adopt the German suggestion to provide a risk weight discount
for commercial real estate loans in particular, if a country can demon-
strate a low-risk track record for such loans.
—To reduce the gaming of the risk weights by banks, the committee
proposed incorporating into the standards risk weights on securitizations
based on the ratings assigned to securitized assets.
—The committee is also considering allowing banks to use their own
internal models of risk to set their capital requirements. This would extend
the committee’s policy of using internal modeling of risks to set capital
requirements, which was adopted for bank trading activities in 1996.
Significantly, the committee did not propose any changes in the levels
of the standards themselves. Banks must still have Tier I capital of at least
4 percent of risk-weighted assets and total capital of at least 8 percent of
such assets. Instead, the common theme behind the proposed changes is
the attempt to inject market discipline into risk-based capital standards
by using the assessments of ratings agencies to determine minimum
capital requirements. 
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Shortcomings of the Proposed Changes to the Basel Standards 
Although the Basel Committee is to be commended for attempting to
address the problems with the current standards that the committee itself
recognizes, we strongly believe that the proposed changes, however well
intentioned, are insufficient and conceivably may even worsen the pre-
existing problems. 
First, the committee’s proposal retains the “risk bucket” approach to
setting the capital standards. This approach continues to ignore the fact
that the true riskiness of a bank’s assets can only be determined by an over-
all view of the portfolio of assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet risks,
rather than by a simple summing of the credit risks of individual invest-
ments. Proper assessments of the risks of bank assets reflect correlations
among the credit risks of individual assets, the interest rate risks of assets
and liabilities, trading risks, and other risks, and the correlations of risks
among these categories. Moreover, although it may not be evident on the
surface, the proposed refinements of the risk weights based on ratings may
introduce even more arbitrariness into the process than now exists. On
what basis, for example, can it be said that credits rated AAA– or AA–
deserve a risk weight of 20 percent, or 7.5 times lower than that of credits
rated below B–, which would be assigned a risk weight of 150 percent
under the proposed system? The relative rankings of the risk categories are
as arbitrary as the existing system, which lumps all types of loans together
in a single risk class.
These are not just technical objections. By failing to measure accurately
individual asset and overall portfolio risks, the current and proposed stan-
dards do not encourage banks to target the appropriate amount of capital to
back the risks they are taking. In turn, when insufficient capital is main-
tained, bank failures become more likely, with attendant costs to the finan-
cial system and taxpayers. In fact, a recent study of the Basel standards
confirms that they have failed to limit bank default risk, have not pro-
vided an accurate reflection of bank asset risk, and, indeed, have encour-
aged banks to assume greater leverage than before the standards were put
into place.30
Second, banks’ decisions to accumulate capital in response to shocks
are particularly weakened by inaccurate standards that encourage “gam-
ing” and “regulatory arbitrage.” Without credible policies to ensure ade-
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quate risk-based capital, in the wake of adverse shocks to bank capital,
banks face incentives to increase risk and reduce capital—precisely at a
time when they should be moving to bolster their capital, inaccurate risk
weights encourage the opposite behavior. For example, one interesting, but
totally artificial, way for banks to “game” the proposed credit-rating-based
system is to have a borrower whose bonds are normally “junk rated”—and
thus require a 150 percent capital risk weight—give up its ratings, which
then entitles it to a 100 percent risk weight. The same company, with no
rating, would require less bank capital to be attached to its loan.31
Third, by constantly refining the risk weights, the Basel Committee
encourages rent-seeking by financial institutions attempting to influence
the capital standards, which results in distortions such as mortgage loans
receiving a 50 percent risk weight discount. 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the proposal contains nothing new
to ensure that member countries actually enforce the standards, a major
drawback to the existing standards. For example, the proposal to allow
banks to move toward the use of internal models for setting capital require-
ments might be desirable if credible penalties for model misspecification
were feasible. But if internal standards are reported only to regulators, and
if regulators can forbear from imposing penalties, then that new approach
to setting capital standards has no more promise than the existing system.
Admittedly, this is not an easy issue to address through the committee struc-
ture itself, since the committee is not, and probably never will be, a supra-
national regulator with authority to penalize the supervisors of individual
countries. However, the committee could establish rules that are relatively
immune to government unwillingness to enforce standards. Indeed, this is
where a credible system of market discipline can play a vital role.
Fifth, the notion that credit ratings accurately reflect “the market” is
illusory. Ratings are not market-driven products, but instead are assess-
ments of credit quality by a rating agency’s analysts. Ordinarily, ratings
may be reliable indicators because inaccurate ratings (failures to foretell
risks) lead investors not to rely on ratings agencies and thus reduce rating
agencies’ fees. But when ratings are employed to satisfy regulatory
requirements, ratings are provided primarily in the interest of issuers, not
investors, which can create a conflict of interest.32 Indeed, there is evidence
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suggesting that the use of private ratings in securitizations has produced
something of a race to the bottom in ratings.33 At the very least, policy-
makers should think long and hard about erecting an entire regulatory
edifice on the weak foundation of the credit rating system.
Finally, as long as the Basel Committee clings to the notion that indi-
vidual loans or off-balance-sheet instruments each must be assigned a sep-
arate risk weight, it will inevitably be forced to play “catch-up” to ongoing
market developments. As we have noted, the financial arena is marked by
constant change. Attempts every few years to refine the standards—
whether by single national regulators or especially by committees of
national regulators—inevitably and always will lag fast-paced market
developments. 
A Better Prudential System: Harnessing the Market 
There is a better way for regulators to proceed. It is by using bona fide
market assessments both to simplify the approach to capital regulation and
to provide the enforcement backbone that the Basel standards currently
lack.
The solution we have recommended in its broadest terms is not new, but
some of its details are.34 Simply put, we propose that the Basel Commit-
tee not merely allow (as is currently the case) but actually mandate that
large banks above a certain size threshold finance a certain portion of
their assets by long-term, uninsured subordinated debt. 
—By long term we mean debt with remaining maturity of more than one
year, with some fraction of outstanding debt maturing regularly (so banks
are required continuously to test their mettle in the marketplace). Unlike
depositors, subordinated debt holders cannot redeem their instruments until
they mature (although they can sell them in the secondary market).35
—By uninsured we mean debt that is credibly unprotected by the gov-
ernment, de facto as well as de jure. Holders of these instruments would
not be protected by deposit insurance. Moreover, subordinated debt would
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35. To strengthen the role of subordinated debt as a buffer of loss, one could also limit
withdrawal at maturity when yields on new offerings are high, as suggested by the Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee (2000).
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be exempted from too-big-to-fail protection, even if other “uninsured”
bank debts were protected.36
—By subordinated we mean instruments that stand behind depositors
and the FDIC in line for repayment should the bank fail (although not nec-
essarily behind other creditors, such as suppliers). Indeed, because holders
of subordinated debt have no upside other than the interest they are
promised, they are likely to be less risk seeking than shareholders. In addi-
tion, the requirement that banks constantly issue some amount of such debt
to the market differentiates the instruments from equity, which typically
is not offered at regular intervals. For these reasons, a properly constructed
subordinated debt requirement actually provides a more effective means of
market discipline for banks than does equity.37
This last point runs against much conventional wisdom, which holds
that equity alone should count as “true” capital because its holders are not
promised a given return, as is the case for subordinated debt. Indeed, the
Basel standards themselves reflect this view, precluding subordinated debt
from counting toward the Tier I requirement (of 4 percent), but allowing it to
make up at least half of the supplemental Tier II requirement (that is, up to
2 percent of risk-weighted assets if total Tier II capital stands at 4 percent). 
One additional feature of our suggested requirement would substan-
tially strengthen subordinated debt as a regulatory tool. A flexible ceiling
could be placed on the interest rate that banks can pay on qualifying sub-
ordinated debt—specifically, the rate could be no higher than, say, the
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36. Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act of 1991 
(FDICIA), the FDIC can only protect uninsured deposits with supernumerary votes by var-
ious regulatory authorities approving such action. Even if such an action were taken on unin-
sured deposits, we believe it is remote at best that the regulatory authorities would extend
protection to holders of subordinated debt and other creditors. Non-deposit creditors are
sophisticated investors and cannot “run” in the same way that depositors can. Thus, it is hard
to see how protection of non-depository debt could be justified by the standard arguments
used to defend deposit insurance (that is, avoidance of systemic risk and losses to small
depositors). Furthermore, FDICIA requires that all banks pay (in proportion to their share of
nationwide deposits) for any protection extended under the act’s systemic risk provisions.
The prospect of imposing such a tax on many innocent banks merely to protect holders of
subordinated debt should be a sufficient incentive for policymakers who are otherwise
inclined to invoke the systemic risk provisions to stop short of protecting subordinated debt.
Still, to be sure that subordinated debt could not be bailed out—an essential requirement if
it is to act as a source of market information and discipline—we propose that it be exempted
both from explicit too-big-to-fail protection and from implicit protection through govern-
ment assistance to banks via “least-cost resolution.” For details, see Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee (2000).
37. See also Benston (1992).
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average rate for BBB-rated securities. Although we have expressed reser-
vations about company-specific ratings, our concerns do not apply to an
average interest rate spread for all securities of a given rating. The purpose
of the interest rate spread ceiling is to provide an automatic mechanism for
constraining a bank’s growth should the market determine its securities to
be excessively risky. We believe that a hard quantity restraint of this type,
which uses the signals from markets as a regulatory tool, would provide an
effective source of discipline, especially for banks judged to be highly
risky and that might otherwise be tempted to issue very-high-yielding
securities in the pursuit of high-risk, go-for-broke investments.
Banks perceived as offering junk debt in the marketplace could also be
made automatically eligible for prompt corrective action, as in the United
States under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act
of 1991 (FDICIA). Doing so would further limit regulatory forbearance by
punishing banks that violate subordinated debt requirements and thus
would provide powerful incentives for troubled banks to rein in risks in the
wake of capital depletion. The automaticity of market-based enforcement
of a subordinated debt requirement of the type we are recommending
would address perhaps the central weakness of the existing Basel stan-
dards: the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism. Because the
subordinated debt requirement is based on clear, observable rules, it would
eliminate problems associated with forbearance. Regulators may try to
pretend that weak banks are stronger than they appear to market partici-
pants, but markets would provide independent assessments, and regulators
would be pressured to accept those market assessments if they persisted.
Regulators would not be able to avoid interventions mandated by 
FDICIA—suspension of dividends, constraints on growth, and so forth—
for weak, undercapitalized banks.
Moreover, because holders of subordinated debt would have no other
upside than the interest to which they are entitled, they would have strong
incentives to encourage banks (and likewise the banks would have strong
incentives to respond) to provide timely, relevant financial information that
is not now being required by rules of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB). In particular, we suspect that over time investors in subor-
dinated debt will strongly encourage, if not demand, FASB to require
U.S. banks to report their assets and liabilities at market values rather
than book values and to do so not merely as footnotes to their balance
sheets, as is now the case. Similarly, we suspect that pressures will mount
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for more disclosure of the nature and extent of the risks to which banks are
exposed on account of their derivatives activities (for example, through
more detailed disclosure of the concentration or dispersion of counter-
parties). Indeed, the subordinated debt requirement would strengthen
many of the initiatives to improve financial accounting standards: account-
ing standards, after all, are only useful if market participants have an
incentive to rely on accurate information to gauge performance and risk.
Subordinated debt would provide that incentive, which is often lacking in
today’s banking systems.
To be sure, a variety of design issues must be resolved before imple-
menting any subordinated debt requirement. Although these are discussed
in greater detail in Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000), we
briefly note a few of these topics here. 
One is the universe of banks to which the requirement should apply.
Given the costs of issuing subordinated debt frequently, the costs of moni-
toring bank issuers, and the relative thinness of the existing bank market—
less than $100 billion in bank debt of this type is now outstanding—we
believe the prudent course is to start by applying it to relatively large banks,
say those with at least $10 billion in assets. An institution of that size would
be required, therefore, to have $200 million in subordinated debt outstand-
ing at any time. The size threshold for the requirement could be ratcheted
down over time as the market for the debt deepens.
We also recommend that, at least initially, the debt be sold in mini-
mum amounts of $100,000—or instruments designed to be purchased by
institutional investors (which could include pensions and mutual funds). A
minimum size requirement would help to ensure that governments are
not tempted to resort to bailouts since the investors at risk presumably are
sophisticated and fully able to assess the risks of purchasing the debt.38
We believe that any subordinated debt requirement can be easily incor-
porated into the existing Basel framework. The least disruptive approach
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38. We also believe there is a case to be made for imposing certain restrictions on the
purchasers of the subordinated debt, in order to ensure that the market provides accurate sig-
nals. Thus, in an ideal world, we would prohibit banks from purchasing each other’s debt (as
a quid pro quo), and we would have regulators ensure that the debt is purchased by disin-
terested third parties at arm’s length. These prohibitions could be enforced by requiring sub-
ordinated debt holders to disclose their holdings to the regulatory authorities (either the SEC
or the appropriate bank regulator). At the same time, we recognize the compliance costs and
administrative difficulties that may be entailed in imposing such a regulatory regime on the
purchasing of subordinated debt and thus are tentative about this particular design element. 
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would be to convert the voluntary use of subordinated debt now in Tier II
to a mandatory 2 percent minimum requirement (with the other features
already described). Ideally, however, we believe the distinction between
the two tiers of capital should be abolished altogether, and thus the 2 per-
cent could apply to the overall capital requirement (irrespective of the
amount of preferred stock or common shares outstanding). Indeed, if we
are right that subordinated debt is actually superior to equity as a source of
effective market discipline, then there is no reason in principle why the
required percentage eventually should not be larger than 2 percent, espe-
cially when account is taken of the fact that interest paid on the debt is
tax deductible for the bank and dividends are not.39
Thinking more ambitiously, in light of the flaws in the current proposed
systems of risk weights identified, we believe that there is a strong case for
scrapping the system of risk weights entirely. If this were done, then the
capital requirements would be reduced to a simple leverage standard, with
required capital (including subordinated debt) expressed as a percentage of
assets and off-balance-sheet risks. We recognize the difficulties in valu-
ing off-balance-sheet items, but we note that their precise measurement is
not as important as it may appear. The reason is that subordinated debt
holders will have strong incentives to require banks to make appropriate
disclosures about their off-balance risks. Those banks that are now “gam-
ing” the current standards by moving their assets off balance sheet would
find it harder to do if they were also subject to the constant discipline of the
debt markets. Furthermore, banks would have little to gain by gaming cap-
ital standards with securitizations. Doing so would reduce the mandated
quantity of subordinated debt but raise the market yield on subordinated
debt—thus risking a regulatory intervention in response to an excessively
high yield. Accordingly, so long as some amount of subordinated debt is
outstanding in the market and must continue to be placed (whether to
finance new assets or replace retiring debt), the requisite discipline would
be there.
A subordinated debt requirement also would eliminate the need for the
Basel Committee to continue attempting to update its standards in
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we expect that, because subordinated debt will provide banks a strong incentive to limit 
their default risk, bank equity capital could rise in the presence of a subordinated debt
requirement.
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response to ongoing market developments. Instead, the marketplace would
assume the job of the committee. New instruments, trading strategies,
and activities would be subject to the constant test of the marketplace,
without the need for changing or inventing new risk weights.
We note with interest that the agreement reached in October 1999
between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury over the appropriate role for
operating subsidiaries in financial modernization included, among other
provisions, a requirement that in order for any of the fifty largest banks in
the United States to own any type of financial subsidiary it must have an
outstanding issue of long-term debt that is rated in one of the three 
highest rating categories by an independent rating agency. Furthermore,
the debt must be held by third parties (not affiliates of the bank) and be
unsecured.40
This requirement is a move in the right direction. It recognizes the
important role that long-term debt can play in providing market-based dis-
cipline. It also recognizes that, at least initially, only the largest banks
should be required to have long-term debt outstanding. If such a require-
ment is appropriate for large banks seeking to own any type of financial
subsidiary, there is no reason why it—or something close to the proposal
we have outlined—should not be extended to large banks under any
circumstances.41
What about International Prudential Regulation of Nonbanks? 
It is tempting to say, for competitive equity reasons, that if the banking
regulators can set common or at least minimum capital standards for the
firms they regulate, then the equivalent bodies for nonbanks—notably
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40. National banks that are between the 51st and 100th largest must meet either the rat-
ing requirement or a comparable test jointly agreed on by the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury. No rating requirement would apply to other banks.
41. A common reaction to our proposal is to note that existing subordinated debt issues
by many large bank holding companies in the United States currently meet or exceed our
minimum requirement. We emphasize that this does not imply that our requirement is
unnecessary, for two reasons. First, our proposed subordinated debt would be more limited
in its contractual form than the debts currently outstanding, in order for it to better serve its
role as a credible source of market discipline. Second, under current law, banks are free to
stop issuing subordinated debt if they choose to do so. Experience suggests that as a bank’s
condition deteriorates it will reduce its reliance on market-priced debt if that is an option.
Our minimum requirement forces banks to stay in the market even when their condition
deteriorates and thus ensures that market discipline is present when it is needed most.
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IAIS for insurance and IOSCO for securities—should do the same. In our
view, that is not a sufficient rationale for having international minimum
solvency standards for these other activities. 
The key reason is that although level-playing-field arguments were an
important political force behind the Basel capital standards, the more
substantive basis for developing international bank standards is that there
are potentially significant cross-border spillover effects if large banks in
some countries fail. It is true that a growing number of firms in these
industries are operating worldwide, suggesting the need for cooperation
among national supervisors. But the global operations of these firms mean
that the orderly resolution of claims following a failure may be facilitated
by common legal rules across countries. In the absence of cross-border
contagion effects or intricate cross-border financial linkages among
different firms, there is no justification for mandating minimum inter-
national solvency standards designed to prevent such failures.42
Indeed, there are grounds for questioning the need for domestic, much
less international, government-imposed capital standards for nonbanking
industries in the first place. In virtually all other sectors of the economy,
the amount of capital backing the assets of firms is determined in the mar-
ketplace. In particular, firms balance the tax advantages of debt (whose
interest costs are deductible at the firm level but taxed at ordinary income
rates when received by investors) against the increasing risks of insol-
vency, and thus the costs of debt and equity increase, as leverage increases.
In the case of banks, however, deposit insurance distorts the decision-
making process. In particular, it essentially eliminates the role of insured
depositors as monitors of the health of banks and thus tilts owners and
decisionmakers toward increasing leverage and asset risk and reducing the
amount of capital they devote to the enterprise. Government-imposed min-
imum capital standards help to rectify this imbalance and serve as a bul-
wark for the deposit insurance funds, and ultimately taxpayers, to absorb
losses that banks may incur. In addition, capital standards provide dynamic
incentives for owners of banks (and their managers) to avoid taking exces-
sive risks at the expense of the insurer (and taxpayers).
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In contrast, there is no government-provided insurance of liabilities of
securities firms and insurance companies. There are industry-supported
funds in each case, but the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC) for securities firms is designed only to protect customers against
fraud or theft by securities firms and not against insolvency. Insurers’
guarantee funds, meanwhile, exist in virtually every state, and these are
true insolvency protection mechanisms. These funds are not backed by
state or federal taxpayers, as is the case with federal deposit insurance for
banks and thrift institutions (although it is possible to argue that such pro-
tection is implicit). 
Given the absence of taxpayer liability for losses, should we let the mar-
ket determine capital levels for securities firms and insurers, subject to
existing antifraud and disclosure laws that now apply to all firms under
securities laws? The only conceivable argument we can see for answering
this question in the negative is to help protect unsophisticated investors or
consumers who are unable either to locate or to read the financial infor-
mation that insurers and securities firms are required to publish. This ratio-
nale is fundamentally different from the main (if not exclusive) rationale
that applies to bank capital requirements. 
In any event, the consumer protection argument is not sufficient, in our
view, to motivate new international capital standards for two reasons. First,
consumer protection standards rightfully vary from country to country.
Citizens, through their governments, should have the freedom to choose
the levels of protection they want. Second, the consumer protection argu-
ment neglects the fact that unsophisticated investors are protected by the
vigilance of informed investors in securities and insurance firms, to the
extent that those firms are forced to finance their activities with funds from
informed outsiders.
An important issue, however, looms for Europe’s universal banks in
particular—the regulation of financial conglomerates that offer a full range
of financial services under one roof, without separate corporate organiza-
tions for what have come to be known as “banking,” “insurance,” and
“securities” products. This, of course, is the model for many European
financial giants, although it is unlikely to be adopted in the United States
(or even Japan, where financial reform still assumes that nonbanking
organizations are conducted either in separate subsidiaries of banks or in
parent corporations with bank subsidiaries). Universal banks are techni-
cally subject to the bank capital standards of the relevant jurisdiction, and
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if the central bank of that jurisdiction is a member of the Basel Committee,
then the Basel capital standards presumably apply. 
We believe that the “risk bucket” approach of the current Basel stan-
dards, which sets capital standards primarily on the basis of the asset-side
investments of the organization, is especially problematic for these
universal banks. The risks of the insurance and securities businesses are
very different from those of banks, and so an approach to capital that effec-
tively assumes that all risks of the organization can be assessed on the
basis of its assets and not the other fundamentals of the various businesses
does not appear well suited for these banks. A far better approach is to
use the kind of market discipline mechanism we have already outlined
for large banks—one that relies on subordinated debt—and then allow
investors and the information intermediaries whom they trust to assess
the risks of the universal banks. 
This still begs the question of whether the current level of the Basel
standards that now applies to banks (8 percent) is sufficient and whether
it should be different for universal banks. The figure of 8 percent is arbi-
trary and unlikely to be the right number for narrow or universal banks.
Historical data on banks and current data on the capital structure of large
unregulated finance companies (which maintain on average an 11 percent
capital-to-assets ratio) suggest that 8 percent may be too low, but at this
time it is hard to know what the right lower bound for bank capital ratios
should be. In the presence of a subordinated debt requirement, however,
that lack of knowledge would be less a problem than it is under current
capital standards. In the presence of credible market discipline, banks
would face a strong incentive to set capital levels appropriately (to avoid
high yields on their subordinated debt), and so we are not very concerned
about the inability to prejudge what the right minimum capital level should
be for banks (whether universal or narrow in scope).
Finally, apart from the ongoing debate over capital standards for finan-
cial institutions, we believe that potentially the most important interna-
tional financial development is the near completion of international
accounting by IASC. Global financial markets demand global financial
reporting rules. During this decade, U.S. residents dramatically increased
their holdings of foreign stocks, while more foreign companies listed
their shares on U.S. stock exchanges.
To date, the SEC has been giving mixed signals about its willingness
to bless the IASC core standards, indicating, on the one hand, that it would
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consider allowing foreign (and domestic) companies to use IASC stan-
dards in our securities markets, but stressing, on the other hand, that
important differences between the IASC standards and GAAP remain. As
is well recognized, the SEC confronts a dilemma: if it rejects the adop-
tion of international standards, it will frustrate a potentially important
initiative, but if it accepts international standards that are widely perceived
in this country to be weaker than GAAP, American companies will com-
plain that they are put at a competitive disadvantage when raising funds
in our equity markets and making acquisitions.
Accounting harmonization would have clear benefits. Although har-
monized accounting standards may not necessarily facilitate the job of
national financial supervisors directly, they would facilitate comparisons
by investors and lenders of the financial health of firms from different
countries. In a global market, to the extent that suppliers of capital can
make apples-to-apples comparisons of the financial health of institutions
from different countries, then capital not only will be allocated more effi-
ciently, but the process of market discipline—to the extent it is not under-
mined by government guarantees—also will be made more effective in the
process. This, in turn, will facilitate the task of financial supervisors, espe-
cially in an environment of rapid technological change.
Nonetheless, the SEC is worried about accepting foreign accounting
standards that could be construed to be “weaker” than prevailing U.S. stan-
dards embodied in GAAP. Furthermore, American businesses—like the
U.S. banks that wanted a level playing field for capital standards—strongly
object to being bound by different, and arguably tougher, standards if
foreign companies gain the right to issue their stocks in our market with-
out having to comply with GAAP.
One way the SEC could escape its dilemma would be to permit all firms
(both U.S. and foreign) to choose between the two different accounting
standards. That would not result in immediate harmonization of standards,
but, as argued above, we believe that, in the long run, permitting competi-
tion among regulatory standards would encourage harmonization and effi-
ciency in accounting standards (and other rules). Another way out for the
SEC would be to require that all firms maintain both sets of accounts. That
may be a desirable way to increase information and comparability, but
the cost of that approach would be the increased costs of preparing and dis-
seminating dual accounts. It is hard for us to judge the size of those costs,
and so we conclude that either permitting companies to choose between
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the two, or mandating that companies maintain both, is a desirable way to
resolve the existing dilemma. Which approach is best depends on the costs
of creating and disseminating duplicate accounts. 
Our purpose here is not to delve deeply into the details of international
accounting standards, a subject explored by Gebhardt in this volume.
Rather, we highlight the potential importance of harmonized accounting
standards for improving the safety and soundness of financial institutions,
in particular, and point to accounting standards as an obvious example of
an area where regulatory competition is likely to produce long-run gains in
both harmonization and efficiency. 
Conclusions 
Financial markets and institutions increasingly are global. Should regu-
lation also be global? In general, we think not. We have suggested an
approach to financial regulation that emphasizes differences between pru-
dential and nonprudential regulation (vis-à-vis the gains from regulatory
consolidation), places more reliance on regulatory competition, seeks to
avoid conflicts of interest for central bank regulators, and puts much
greater emphasis on discipline by the market rather than by regulators.
Furthermore, we argue that the only strong case for minimum solvency
standards for financial institutions exists with respect to banks and that
policymakers should not rush to create international bank-like solvency
systems for nonbanks.
Over the longer run, regulators, investors, and consumers will profit
from regulatory harmonization—in accounting and disclosure standards in
particular—but this process is best achieved by permitting competition
among standards, rather than by prejudging the relative efficiency of dif-
ferent standards and mandating harmonization on that basis. If securities
regulators around the world, including those in the United States, will
accept competition in accounting and other standards, there will be much
greater competition among national exchanges for listings, leading to lower
prices for investors and more efficient capital markets. And, to the extent
that bank regulators rely more heavily on subordinated debt to help disci-
pline bank behavior, they will encourage private participants to demand
more useful and relevant information from banks than even these interna-
tional standards must require.
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Comments
and Discussion
Comment by Richard J. Herring: This ambitious paper provides a use-
ful and timely overview of the trend toward the formation of financial
mega-conglomerates and poses the important question, “Do global mega-
conglomerates require global regulation?” I would like to approach this
question from a slightly different perspective, asking first, “What is the
appropriate size of a regulatory domain?” and, second, “To what extent
and under what circumstances is international regulatory cooperation
likely?” Then I will conclude with a discussion of the authors’ promising
policy proposals.
The literature on federalism offers several insights about the appropriate
size of the regulatory domain.1 Four considerations help to determine the
appropriate size of the regulatory domain. Each may vary with the motive
for regulation, which may include protecting consumers, enhancing the
efficiency of financial markets, achieving social objectives such as
promoting homeownership, fighting organized crime, or guarding against
systemic risk. 
—The extent of externalities. If regulation is to be effective in correct-
ing externalities, the jurisdictional boundaries should correspond to the
scope of negative externalities. Calomiris and Litan argue that the
strongest case for international regulation can be made with respect to sys-
temic risk.2
1. See, for example, Mashaw and Rose-Ackerman (1984) and the discussion in chap-
ter 3 of Herring and Litan (1995).
2. The globalization of organized crime may provide another externalities-based ratio-
nale for global regulation, but this issue is outside the scope of this already ambitious
paper. 
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—The prevention of mutually destructive competition among regula-
tors. This issue is sometimes posed as a prisoner’s dilemma among
national regulators in which international cooperation among regulators
could enable all national regulators to attain their objectives more effec-
tively. I am generally skeptical about this rationale. It is certainly true
that international financial integration has undermined the capacity of indi-
vidual countries to tax financial transactions, to demand arbitrarily high
levels of consumer protection, or to allocate credit to preferred borrow-
ers, but national preferences about such regulation differ markedly. It is by
no means clear that national regulatory “prisoners” would choose to
cooperate. The main exception may be prudential regulation. The authors
are troubled by the possibility that international regulatory competition in
this sphere may lead to a mutually destructive race to the bottom. I am less
concerned because I believe that safety and soundness are a benefit that
users of financial services value in an international context.3
—Economies of scale and scope in the administration of regulations.
Regulation requires the production, transmission, and interpretation of
information relevant to the regulated entity’s activities. The international
reach of the activities of mega-conglomerates means that at least some of
this information will be collected beyond national regulatory domains. To
the extent that there are substantial fixed costs in the collection and inter-
pretation of the data, there may be gains from centralizing this function
in an agency with a comparable global reach. Similarly, to the extent that
investments in the collection and interpretation of data reduce costs in reg-
ulating a broad range of activities, there may be gains from expanding the
regulatory domain across borders and financial activities. 
—The trade-off between the benefits of harmonized regulation and the
benefits of regulatory competition. Uniform international regulations
reduce the costs of regulatory compliance for international institutions and
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regulators of thrift institutions in the United States in the 1980s. But this example has doubt-
ful relevance to the international sphere. State regulators were able to compete in laxity of
regulation because they benefited from national deposit insurance that led depositors to
ignore the safety and soundness implications of regulations. In contrast, international
investors will evaluate national prudential standards in conjunction with implicit and explicit
national deposit insurance. Although some countries may be able to compensate for weak
prudential regulation with strong deposit insurance, when bank losses become large rela-
tive to the government’s ability to make good on the guarantee, depositors will run, as they
did during the recent Asian financial crises. 
9550—07-Brks Wharton Ch 4  8/11/00 16:26  Page 325
are more likely to generate predictable outcomes when problems are taken
to court. This benefit should not be dismissed lightly in a world where an
international mega-conglomerate may be subject to reporting requirements
from several hundred different regulatory authorities. But a regulatory
monopoly is likely to suffer from many of the same defects as an industrial
monopoly.4 The possibility for users of financial services to shift among
differently regulated financial institutions and the opportunity for regu-
lated firms to shift among regulators provide a useful protection against
arbitrary or excessively burdensome regulation and are likely to result in
more efficient regulation. There are dynamic benefits as well. Competition
stimulates innovation. In an era of rapid technological advance and finan-
cial innovation, competition among regulators is more likely to lead to a
dynamically efficient regulatory framework in which regulated institutions
can adjust flexibly to the changing needs of their clients.
Calomiris and Litan are well aware of this trade-off and consequently
advocate minimal harmonization of regulation. Because they are con-
cerned that systemic risk can lead to costly international spillovers and
they are concerned about the possibility of a destructive competition in
laxity of regulation, they make a case for harmonizing minimum pruden-
tial standards, while at the same time encouraging regulatory competition
in other aspects of financial regulation. This is an appealing solution, but it
is easier to describe than to implement. As table 1 highlights, most regu-
latory measures serve a number of different regulatory objectives. Disclo-
sure requirements, for example, can be justified as a means of increasing
market discipline to reduce systemic risk as well as a way of protecting
consumers and enhancing the efficiency of financial markets. For this
reason, it is difficult to harmonize regulatory measures for one regulatory
purpose without constraining competition among regulators for other
regulatory objectives as well. 
Nonetheless, the European Union (EU) under the second banking direc-
tive has tried to achieve a trade-off between the benefits of regulatory har-
monization and competition that is very similar to what the authors advo-
cate. After harmonizing basic safety and soundness regulations in all
member countries, the European Union adopted principles of mutual
recognition and a single European passport that allows a bank chartered
under the rules in any member country to open branches in any other mem-
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ber country. This creates a competitive dynamic among national regulators
in the European Union in which each national regulator can compete for
greater market share by providing the most efficient regulatory frame-
work without raising concerns about a mutually destructive degradation of
prudential standards. The European Union was able to achieve this degree
of international cooperation, which includes a limited amount of central-
ized, supra-national policymaking and enforcement, because of the over-
arching political aims of the fifteen member countries. It is doubtful that
a more heterogeneous group of countries, without similar political ambi-
tions, could achieve a comparable degree of cooperation. 
The useful review of efforts to achieve international cooperation that
Calomiris and Litan provide indicates that international efforts have fallen
short of the EU accomplishment. Table 2 ranks levels of international
cooperation by the degree of national sovereignty relinquished. Normally
cooperation proceeds in stages from lower to higher levels. As the authors
note, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors has advanced
from level one, sharing of information, to level two, agreement on con-
Charles W. Calomiris and Robert E. Litan 327
Table 1.  Regulatory Measures and Objectives
Broader
Systemic Consumer Efficiency social
Regulatory measures risk protection enhancement objectives
Antitrust enforcement and competition 
policy   
Asset restrictions  
Capital adequacy standards  
Conduct of business rules   
Conflict of interest rules  
Customer suitability requirements 
Deposit insurance  
Disclosure standards   
Fit and proper entry tests   
Interest rate ceilings on deposits  
Interest rate ceilings on loans  
Investment requirements 
Liquidity requirements  
Reporting requirements for large 
transactions 
Reserve requirements  
Restrictions on geographic reach 
Restrictions on services and product 
lines  
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cepts, procedures, and best practices. The International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has advanced from levels one and two to
level three, collaborative contingency planning, with the adoption of the
Windsor Declaration, which establishes protocols to prevent international
transmission of crises in securities markets. The new Financial Stability
Forum, building off the work of the other international groups, appears to
have started at level three. Only in the sphere of banking regulation, with
the work of the Basel Committee, has international cooperation advanced
to level five, actual international harmonization of regulations. But, as the
authors emphasize, even the Basel Committee has been unable to advance
to level six, the joint enforcement of harmonized regulations.
What factors determine the extent of international cooperation? Cooper
draws some interesting lessons from the history of international coopera-
tion in public health that appear to have equal relevance for banks.5 He
finds that international cooperation is more likely (1) the smaller the num-
ber and the more homogeneous the countries that must agree, (2) the
broader and deeper the international consensus on policy objectives and
potential gains from cooperation, (3) the broader and deeper the interna-
tional consensus on the probable consequences of policy alternatives, and
(4) the stronger the infrastructure for decisionmaking. From this perspec-
tive, it is not surprising that international cooperation started first and has
proceeded farthest in the banking sector. First, because banks headquar-
tered in the Group of Ten countries (plus Luxembourg and Switzerland)
account for a very large proportion of international banking transactions,
cooperation among these relatively homogeneous countries could have a
decisive impact on international banking conditions. Second, bank super-
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Table 2.  Degrees of  International Cooperation
Ranka Type of cooperation
1 Exchange of information
2 Agreement on concepts, procedures, and best practices
3 Collaborative contingency planning
4 Negotiation of minimum acceptable standards
5 Harmonization of regulations
6 Joint enforcement of harmonized regulations
7 Centralized, supranational policymaking and enforcement
a. In order of amount of national sovereignty relinquished.
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visory authorities in all major countries share a concern with financial
stability, and a series of banking disasters beginning with the collapse of
Herstatt in 1974 have demonstrated that banking crises can pose a serious
threat to financial stability that international supervisory cooperation could
diminish. Third, despite major differences in regulatory regimes among the
Group of Ten, bank regulators in each member country share the view
that minimum capital standards are an important bulwark of financial
stability. Finally, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision could draw
on the well-established institutional infrastructure of the Group of Ten
central bank governors who have met monthly in Basel for many decades.
International cooperation within the Basel Committee proceeded from
an initial exchange of information to agreements on concepts, procedures,
and best practices in banking supervision. This led naturally to collabora-
tive contingency planning. The Basel Concordat set out a sharing of super-
visory responsibilities between host and home countries, which ultimately
was restated as a set of minimum acceptable standards for the supervision
of internationally active banks. Finally, with the Basel Accord, the
committee agreed on a harmonized approach to capital regulation with a
common definition of capital and procedures for evaluating capital ade-
quacy along with minimum acceptable standards. 
These considerations help to explain why international cooperation in
insurance and securities regulation has lagged behind cooperation in bank-
ing regulation. Perhaps because the world economy has been spared a seri-
ous disruption attributable to international spillovers from the collapse of
a securities or insurance firm, there is less agreement on the potential gains
from international cooperation or the consequences of failing to cooperate.
Regulation of securities firms and insurance companies is much more
diverse than bank regulation, including official and self-regulatory bodies
and financial exchanges. The number of policymakers that must be con-
sulted and reach agreement is much larger and more diverse. And because
neither securities regulation nor insurance regulation is generally lodged in
the central bank, neither the International Association of Insurance Super-
visors nor IOSCO can draw on the long tradition of central bank coopera-
tion (although the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
meets at the Bank for International Settlements).
Since international cooperation is most advanced in bank regulation,
Calomiris and Litan devote most of their attention to the Basel Accord
and the recent proposed revision to it. They emphasize several defects in
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the Basel Accord. First, the emphasis on grouping assets in risk buckets
is fundamentally flawed because it ignores portfolio effects that are criti-
cal for assessing a bank’s risk of insolvency. Second, the risk weights
assigned to the various risk buckets are arbitrary and do not reflect market
assessments of risk; therefore, the risk weights may distort bank behav-
ior, as the Basel Committee itself has admitted. Calomiris and Litan,
however, take a dim view of the committee’s attempt to correct this prob-
lem by relating risk weights to ratings by independent agencies. Third,
the Basel Accord omits several other sources of risk such as operational
risk and liquidity risk that may be an important source of insolvency expo-
sure. Fourth, the Basel Committee cannot keep pace with financial inno-
vations, and distortions arising from the arbitrary risk weights may lead
to financial innovations that increase risk. Fifth, the Basel Accord limits
the use of subordinated debt to satisfy minimum capital requirements.
Sixth, there is no rationale for the specified 8 percent minimum acceptable
capital requirement. And, finally, enforcement of minimum capital stan-
dards is left entirely to the discretion of national supervisory authorities
who are free to employ a wide variety of accounting gimmicks to avoid
recognizing a decline in capital adequacy.
Although the Basel Committee has stated that it favors greater reliance
on market discipline to meet capital adequacy standards, the committee’s
new proposal has little to say about how this might be accomplished.
Calomiris and Litan remedy this shortcoming by proposing that greater
reliance be placed on the issuance of subordinated debt. In particular,
they recommend that internationally active banks be required to issue
subordinated debt equal to no less than 2 percent of their risk assets with
new issues at regular intervals subject to a cap on the permissible interest
differential above the risk-free rate. I have considerable sympathy with
their approach.6
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that Calomiris and Litan favor out-
sourcing prudential supervision to the market. Their approach holds the
promise of correcting all of the defects they identified in risk-adjusted cap-
ital requirements. The artificial risk buckets that have been designated by
the regulatory authorities will not distract market participants. They will
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6. I have also advocated greater reliance on subordinated debt in work with Bob Litan
(Herring and Litan [1995]) and participated in the drafting of the Shadow Financial Regu-
latory Committee (2000) white paper arguing for a subordinated debt requirement for inter-
nationally active banks.
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take a portfolio view in pricing subordinated debt because that is what
matters for the risk of insolvency. Similarly, the Basel Committee need not
struggle to adjust the risk weights to reflect changing financial conditions
because market participants will monitor banks on a continuous basis and
will price subordinated debt with a view toward the overall risk of insol-
vency. Similarly, the market will discipline harmful regulatory arbitrage
that increases an institution’s risk of insolvency by charging a higher
premium on its subordinated debt. What matters to market participants is
not the officially specified minimum acceptable capital requirement. If
market participants believe that a bank needs to hold more than the official
8 percent ratio to achieve an acceptable risk of insolvency, new issues of
subordinated debt will be priced above the permissible premium until the
bank increases its capital position or reduces its exposure to risk. More-
over, enforcement of minimum capital requirements will be more even-
handed and consistent across countries because market participants are not
likely to be misled even if regulators attempt to disguise a deterioration
of capital positions through accounting gimmicks. 
The subordinated debt requirement also deals with the problem of
mega-conglomerates where the traditional approach of assessing capital
requirements against risk buckets is particularly inadequate. Market par-
ticipants will take an overall view of a mega-conglomerate’s risk of insol-
vency, just as they do with regard to nonfinancial institutions, and will
price its subordinated debt accordingly. 
The authors believe that a subordinated debt requirement would
improve disclosure. Financial institutions would have an incentive to make
more meaningful disclosures of their risk exposures in order to obtain
lower risk premiums on their issues of subordinated debt. Similarly, mar-
ket participants are likely to increase the demand for harmonization of
accounting information that will enable them to compare risk exposures of
internationally active banks more readily. 
The authors make the strongest possible case for the adoption of a sub-
ordinated debt requirement. But even if one is skeptical about whether all
of these benefits can be fully realized, their central point is surely correct.
No matter what degree of international cooperation the national authorities
ultimately achieve, supervisors will always lag behind the marketplace.
In principle, impersonal market forces, unencumbered by the complex
bargaining that is intrinsic to any international bureaucratic process,
should be able to monitor the insolvency exposure of mega-conglomerates
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more efficiently and discipline institutions that take excessive risks.
Calomiris and Litan deserve praise for having shown a practical way these
potential benefits could be realized.
Comment by John G. Heimann: I would like to make a number of com-
ments and, first, to say where I agree and then where I disagree. I think
the paper is terrific. I agree with much in the conclusions. However, I find
much to fault in reaching those conclusions. I will deal with the conclu-
sions first.
I agree that the market is the best regulator. Supervisors and regulators
are bloodhounds chasing greyhounds. The bloodhounds may have the
scent, but the greyhounds are over the hill in the next county. That is
reality. It is not a knock on supervisors and regulators; it is just that they do
not have the resources to keep up with the private sector. Therefore, the
market is the best regulator. And I think the concept of subordinated debt
is excellent. It is worth a try. 
Let me tell you a story. When I first became comptroller of the currency,
there was a problem, and the examiners figured it out. After we had a long
discussion, the head of the department of economics said, and I quote, “I
know it works in practice, but the important thing to determine is whether
it works in theory.” I know subordinated debentures work in theory; the
question is whether they will work in practice. That does not mean it is
not worth a try. But if it is applied, will it work for the smaller banks,
which do not have markets for their securities? In the United States, at
least, we have loads and loads of smaller banks. Something has to be done
about them, because the market is not going to regulate them using sub-
ordinated debentures, and this approach certainly does not apply in the
developing countries or most of the developing countries, which repre-
sent a lot of the world and most of its people.
So that is problem number one, which brings me to the last point that
was discussed—the need for international accounting standards, which I
wholeheartedly support. The first part is useless unless you have account-
ing standards that mean something that everybody understands and unless
you have transparency and disclosure.
Maybe it is a chicken and egg question. In some countries, the concept
of subordinated debentures works very well because they have generally
accepted accounting principles or international accounting standards, but
in many countries, they do not. Without those standards, the concept of
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subordinated debentures has limited application, although, theoretically,
it is terrific and should work in practice.
Now, let me go where I disagree. When it comes to nonbank financial
institutions, the financial system of the world is inextricably intertwined.
American International Group was mentioned, and you know their role in
the derivatives market. AXA has control of many financial institutions, and
so does Alliance. You can talk about a Morgan Stanley or a Goldman Sachs
or a Merrill Lynch, with their enormous balance sheets, all in marketable
securities and all heavily in derivatives. Do we have to wait? You cannot let
these institutions just go merrily on their way and say that the market is
going to take care of them. 
Look back on the situation with Drexel Burnham Lambert, which was
resolved. But how was it resolved? What actually happened? Its primary
regulator—the Securities and Exchange Commission—did not resolve
the liquidation. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York stepped in and
resolved it. They understood what to do about mortgage-backed securi-
ties and derivatives.
The role of nonbank financial institutions is growing. Global financial
intermediation is enormous. It is pervasive. And to say that we have to wait
for something to come apart is just bad policy. Probably what will happen
is that some big nonfinancial institution will get into trouble.
Often, too big to fail is raised. People raise this when they want to prove
a point of moral hazard. I think this debate has become meaningless
because too big to fail was never a thoughtful policy. It was a clever phrase
turned into policy that, in turn, has become an accepted concept.
The question should be whether there is any financial institution in the
world that is too big to disappear. The answer to that should be no, there
is not. It depends on what you mean by disappear. If you want market
discipline, some institutions will be disciplined, and they will be denied
access, and they will cease to function, so there should be no institution
that is too big to disappear. It is a question of how it disappears. Too big
to fail raises specters in the minds of politicians and the public alike and
muddies the water. I hope that we get rid of too big to fail and start talk-
ing about too big to disappear because if you use that phrase, it changes a
lot of what you can do in these situations.
The second point is that there is no international mechanism for enforc-
ing standards. This is a very personal point of view, of course. Why not
allow the market to enforce the standards? Why do banks lend in countries
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that have rotten accounting standards? I do not worry about investors so
much. They are supposed to know that if they buy equities, they have to
take the ups and the downs. But why do banks lend in markets where the
accounting standards are horrible, there is no legitimate transparency, and
disclosure has little value? If you want market discipline, creditors and
investors have got to take a loss of some sort. That does not happen now,
and it is partially the regulator’s fault.
The next question is whether to consolidate supervision. My answer is
yes. That anyone can argue against consolidated supervision is a mystery
to me, so I do not bother about that.
Regarding cross-functional activities, does all supervision have to be
under one supervisor? Not necessarily. It can be functional. By that I mean
that the specialized supervisors can do that piece of the supervision, but
in the final analysis, someone has to oversee the whole institution, not as
the regulator, but as the supervisor of the whole.
Regulators should be absolutely independent, and that is a must. This
ability also depends on which country you are in and how independence
is maintained.
Everyone is applauding the financial modernization bill, and I think it is
terrific. It is a very big step in the right direction, except for one thing. It
puts a lot of banking supervision into the Treasury Department, a politi-
cal agency whose head could be fired by the president. That does not mean
that I have any questions about the present incumbents, but we are build-
ing a system for the next fifteen to fifty years. Who knows who the secre-
tary of the treasury is going to be twenty-five or fifty years from now? Who
knows who the comptroller will be?
We in the United States have been arguing that countries should have
independent banking supervision. We fought to convince the International
Monetary Fund to support that. Then we go in the opposite direction. I 
do not hear anybody talking about that. I suppose everyone is so happy 
to have a bill that they overlook some of its worrisome long-term
implications.
Banking supervision should be independent. If we cannot have an inde-
pendent agency for banking supervision in the United States, which clearly
does not seem feasible, then the Federal Reserve should be the supervisor
because it is independent. Placing banking supervision in the Treasury
Department will eventually be a problem. It always has been in every sin-
gle country. We are not immune to that, and it is going to cause us a real
headache later on. 
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I do not have any problems with competition among regulators. Does
that include offshore centers? What kind of competition are we talking
about? Are we talking about different techniques that are interesting
nuances in financial systems in the world as it changes? Some countries
issue licenses like crazy under a regulatory guise so that companies can
operate above and beyond prudential standards, whatever those standards
are. I have problems with that.
And, finally, on international cooperation, Herring did a super job, but
he left one thing out: trust. If you want to know the secret of the Basel
Committee, it is all of those things he listed plus trust.  The men and
women on the Basel Committee—I should say that I sit on that commit-
tee as chairman of the Financial Stability Institute—trust each other; they
know each other; they understand the problems; and they help each other.
When there are problems occurring in their countries, they can—off the
record—call up the supervisor, whom they know. They have had dinner
with him; they have chatted about their children. They can call him up
and say, “Hey, Harry, I have got a real problem here, can you help me?”
So trust means that they get together and know each other and are able
to make this kind of thing work. It does work at the Basel Supervisory
Committee, but there is no other group like that in the world.
General Discussion: Edward Ettin expressed his hope that within a rela-
tively short time span, the internal risk ratings that are being developed
by several large U.S. commercial banks can be translated into standardized
risk ratings that can be used for slotting risk for capital allocation. The
supervisors in the meantime will need to test whether their methodology
and its application to internal management systems are done correctly.
Although he does not think the technology is there yet, Ettin believes that
it eventually will evolve into full credit models that will be applied by both
large and individual banks. 
George Vojta remarked that before shifting directly to the risk-adjusted
models, it is important to allow the industry at least to perfect an operat-
ing risk module that makes sense, because development work remains to
be done on the areas not fully covered by the risk-adjusted guidelines in
the industry. Vojta further questioned the marginal utility of risk-adjusted
measures when there is too much risk concentration, making the appro-
priate action impossible. For instance, if a banking institution with a
trillion-dollar balance sheet discovers, after risk adjustment analysis, that
it is too exposed to a certain industry by $50 billion, it is probably impos-
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sible to reduce the exposure to a manageable level in a short period of
time. In such a case, what is the point of risk adjustment analysis if it is not
affecting anything significant?
Myron Kwast questioned the necessity for the authors’ suggestion of a
mandatory subordinated debt policy. He argued that the market for the sub-
ordinated debt of the largest banking organizations already works fairly
well. Firms that are relatively high risk tend not to issue debt when their
risk profiles go up and there is a substantial amount of uninsured bank
liabilities in the market. He expressed his concerns that a mandatory sub-
ordinated debt policy would impose some costs and limit firms’ ability to
manage their capital structures. 
Charles Calomiris responded by explaining that when banks experience
severe shocks to their capital, their next decision is whether to shrink their
assets or to change the composition of their financing to increase the
amount of insured financing. The paper proposes having banks maintain 
an amount of uninsured debt proportional to assets so that they have to
liquefy their assets and reduce the risk of their assets in response to an
adverse capital shock. 
Calomiris also pointed to the benefits of consolidated supervision. It is
important, for instance, that bank regulators supervise banks to see if they
are violating restrictions against unlawful transactions between affiliates,
under sections 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Reserve Act. However, he
emphasized that the paper does not advocate a single agency acting as a
consolidated supervisor. Instead, it suggests that there are some benefits to
regulatory competition. Furthermore, even in a regime of consolidated
supervision and universal banking, it is not necessary for that regulator to
supervise every aspect of a universal bank’s activities, whether in its affil-
iates or subsidiaries, but only the aspects that relate to reasonable pruden-
tial concerns.
Finally, in connection with the authors’ discussion of global account-
ing standards, Gregory Udell asked whether it might be possible to list for-
eign companies that do not meet the U.S. GAAP requirements, but instead
to limit their trading on the exchange to sophisticated investors or institu-
tional investors in a 144(a) type of setting. He argued that such a system
would at least protect small investors. 
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